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,MANAGING UNCERTAINTYan ingUnce lin
Unpredictable events surround economic deci-
sions and are often critical to their outcome. For
example, was it uncertain demographic change or
inflation that was responsible for the rise in housing
prices relative to other assets in the 1970s? In the
conductofmonetary policy, the choice ofstrategies
relieson the predictabilityofthe behaviorofmoney
demand. And unexpected fluctuations in interest
rates, such as those experienced in the recent past,
have had a major impact ondepository institutions'
net interest income. The three articles in this Eco-
nomic Review present methods for identifying the
effects of unpredictable events and for managing
uncertainty.
Some housing economists h~ve attributed most
of the increase in the value of housing relative to
corporate stock in the 1970s to increased specula-
tive demand. They believe the increased demand
resulted from the interaction ofinflation and a non-
indexed tax system. Roger Craine, in the first ar-
ticle, points out that demographic shifts in the
demand for housing also has a significant impacton
its relative price. His conclusion has an implication
for thefuture ofthe housing marketthatdiffers from
that commonly held. Even ifinflation abates in the
1980s and reduces the speculativedemandfor hous-
ing, Craine's findings imply that there will remain a
strong demographic demand for housing.
Craine believes that the uncertainty associated
with the householdformation rate ofthepost-World
WarIIbabyboomincreased the risk associated with
housing investments. As a result, the rate ofreturn
on houses had to exceed the average rate ofreturn
on other assets to compensate investors. In a series
ofregressions ofexcess returns to housing on short-
run anticipated household formation and inflation,
he shows that the influence ofhousehold formation
cannotbe dismissed in a statistical sense: "Thedata
support the hypothesis that one orthe other orboth
expected inflation and household formation influ-
4
enced the rate ofreturn on...housing overthe 1965
to 1980 period."
John Judd addresses the question ofwhether the
decline in the velocity ofMl in 1982 was due to an
unexpected upward shift in the public's desire to
hold money or to a predictable money demand re-
sponse to dropping interest rates and inflation. In
that year, the velocity of Ml declined at a 4.6
percent rate (it had risen at an average 2.8 percent
annual rate for the last twenty years), and led some
to concludethat this was anotherinstanceofmoney-
demand "instability"-ofthe public's demand for
moneyturning outto be different from whathistori-
cal relationships would have predicted.
Judd uses the San Francisco Money Market
Model to show that the demand for money was
"consistent with available information on the be-
havior of widely recognized determinants of Ml
growth," and thus did not constitute a shift in de-
mand. He finds that the rapid Ml-growth in the last
two quarters of 1982 can be "explained by the
moderate growth in nominal income and the large
decline in short-term interest rates."
Instead ofbeing an unpredictable change in pub-
lic behavior, the decline in velocity was a response
to the large drop in inflation which permitted a
parallel decline in nominal interest rates although
not in real interest rates. Since money demand re-
sponds to nominal interest rates, the public was
willing to hold more MI. But since GNP growth
responds to real rates of interest, GNP did not re-
ceivethe same stimulus: "Asa resultmoneygrowth
accelerated relative to GNP growth, implying a
decline in velocity." Judd's analysis suggests that
velocity should exhibit more "normal" behavior in
the second halfof1983 because inflation appears to
have stabilized at its new lower level.
In the last article, Alden Toevs develops a better
model for banks and otherdepository institutions to
use in monitoring and managing the exposure ofbank.earnings to unforeseen changes in interest
rates. The modelofcomparisonis the popular"gap
management model" where the gap refers to the
dollarvaluedifference betweenrate-sensitive assets
(i.e., assets whose yields aresensitive tochanges in
market rates of interest) and rate-sensitive liabili-
ties. According to the gap model, a bank would
hedgeagainstearnings beingaffected by changes in
interestrates (so-calledinterestrate risk) bykeeping
thegapequaltozero inthetimeintervalconcerned.
Toevs, however, notes two serious shortcom-
ings. First, he believes that the existing model''un-
necessarily constrains a bank's choice ofassets and
liabilities" in creating a hedge. The constraints, in
tum, reduce "the bank's ability to accommodate
customer demands for bank services." Second, the
model is unable to generate "asimple and reliable
index ofinterest-rate risk exposure.',
Toimprove on the gap model, Toevs develops a
"duration" gap model that, by using more general
conditions for hedging interest rate risk and by
incorporating .the timing of repricing decisions by
the bank, "reveals a larger set ofasset and liability
choices to financial institutions" to hedge net inter-
est income. With the model, he is also able to
develop "risk-return frontiers" to quantify the
choices for those institutions that wish to position
their balance sheets to profit from interest rate fore-
casts. The duration gap model also yields a single
number to quantify the risk positionofthe financial
institution using it. This number is useful ifinterest
rate risk for the entire bank is to be hedged in the
futures market. Finally, the duration gap model is
generalized to hedge the market value ofbankcapi-
tal against unexpected change in interest rates.
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